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Abstract—Both academia and industry advocate the security
by design principle to stress the importance of dealing with
security from the earliest stages in software development. Never-
theless, designers often have to resort to their own knowledge and
experience to pro-actively identify and mitigate potential security
problems. Moreover, research shows that correctly applying secu-
rity solutions is a much more significant challenge for designers,
rather than finding an adequate solution. Therefore, there is a
need for techniques that ensure a correct application of a security
design solution. The contribution of this paper is a model in
which the security-relevant aspects of a design can be precisely
expressed in an integrated manner, enabling thorough reasoning
about these aspects. We illustrate this model with a sizeable model
of a banking system and show how the precise semantics of this
model enables the tool-supported construction of proofs about the
correctness of the applied design solutions. Our proposal thus
enables designers to obtain stronger guarantees, ensuring the
correctness of their solutions. The presented model can serve as
the foundation for security by design, in time enabling automated
security verification throughout the software development cycle.
Keywords-Security by design, software design, security analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Security by design is often evoked to stress the importance
of dealing with security early on in the software development
life cycle, i.e. starting from the high-level design of a software
system. In practice, this means that designers need to identify
potential security problems early on, and pro-actively provide
countermeasures preventing these. They typically have to rely
to a large extent on their own knowledge and experience, aug-
mented with a collection of common security design strategies
such as security tactics [1] and patterns [2], [3], [4].
Earlier research has indicated that selecting an adequate
countermeasure from such a collection is not the critical
challenge for designers, but correctly applying the selected
countermeasure is [5]. Thus designers could profit from sup-
port to correctly instantiate a known security design solution
to improve the correctness and quality of their design artefacts.
The main focus of this paper is the proposal of a security
model that allows to precisely model a wide variety of security
solutions, and enables a formal verification of the instantiated
security solutions. This aspect of the secure development
process has not yet been thoroughly investigated [6].
We propose a model that is inspired by Data Flow Diagrams
(DFD) [7]. DFDs were originally introduced as a general-
purpose analysis tool, and are straightforward to use and
understand. Furthermore, they are already extensively used in
security design, for example to perform a security analysis
with STRIDE [8, chapter 3]. In contrast to generic DFDs,
though, our model has been specifically designed for the
purpose of security. In practice, this means that our model
replaces the traditional DFD element types with multiple
security-specific ones, and attaches a precise semantics to
each such element. These semantics can then be leveraged
to specify security designs, and formally prove whether or
not security properties, such as data confidentiality, hold for
a design. Thereby complementing the designer’s knowledge
with strong, proven guarantees. The model and accompanying
verification techniques are intended to serve as a foundation
for security by design. We evaluate our proposal by modelling
the security design of a realistically sized banking application.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we lay the groundwork for this paper
by (1) introducing the running example, (2) providing some
background information about DFDs, and (3) illustrating why
DFDs by themselves are not sufficient for security by design.
Running example. Throughout this paper, we demonstrate
our approach with the design of a realistically complex and
large banking system. We have already used this system in
earlier work [5] and it has served as the project assignment
for a master course on software architecture. The complete
architecture is documented in a 32 page PDF file containing
UML diagrams and documentation of its interfaces [9].
We have modelled the entire banking system in our model.
Nevertheless, for comprehensibility, this paper focuses on only
a part of it, namely customers logging in via the bank’s
website and initiating a transaction (wire transfer) between
two accounts. An evident security requirement in this context
is that an attacker cannot tamper with such transactions.
DFDs. As mentioned, our model is inspired by Data Flow
Diagrams (DFD), which consist of (external) entities, pro-
cesses, data stores, and data flows between these elements.
Figure 1 contains an example DFD for a part of our banking
system. When logging in, the customer (represented by the
Browser entity) transmits his or her username and password
to the Load balancer process. They are then forwarded to the
Login process, which verifies whether these match with the
credentials stored in the Customer store. If so, a session is
opened in the Session store and the session id is sent back to
the browser. Subsequently, the customer performs a transaction
by providing the session id and the transaction details (i.e. the
source and target accounts, the desired amount, and an optional
comment), which are processed by the Transaction processor
and eventually stored in the Transaction store.
DFDs and security. DFDs are more suitable to model the
functional data flows of a software system, rather than its
security-specific aspects such as user authentication. This is
because DFDs lack a unique way to augment them with
security-relevant information. For example, in the diagram in
Figure 1, the fact that the Login process does not compare the
actual password of the user to the stored password, but works
with hashed versions of them, can only be derived from the
smart data flow labels given by the designer. Furthermore,
while the designer may know that the Transaction processor
must authorise an incoming transaction, e.g. check whether the
customer is allowed to initiate the transaction from the given
source account, the DFD itself does not indicate this.
Despite their successful application in security analysis, this
small example already highlights some shortcomings of DFDs.
With our model we attempt to alleviate these by providing a
formal, security-oriented underpinning that enables the precise
definition and verification of security solutions.
III. A PRECISE MODEL FOR SECURITY
From a bird’s-eye view, our model consists of three main
concepts: data operated on by processes that can be connected
to each other to form networks; further detailed in this section.
We have chosen to specify our entire model using the Coq
Proof Assistant [10], yielding machine-checked proofs as well
as a virtually unconstrained expressivity. For the purpose of
comprehensibility and brevity, we opt to limit the amount of
Coq code in this paper. The interested reader can consult the
complete implementation via the accompanying website [9].
A. Data
Data is often a primary asset in software security, thus
representing it is a necessity for our model. We define data
as an inductive type (lines 1-10), where each constructor
corresponds to a type of data on which processes can operate.
1 Inductive Data : Type :=
2 | plain: nat → nat → Data
3 | key: CryptoKey → Data
4 | id: Identity → Data
5 | cred: Credential → Data
6 | sid: SessionId → Data
7 | enc: Data → CryptoKey → Data
8 | hashed: Data → Data
9 | sig: Data → CryptoKey → Data
10 | collection: nat → list Data → Data
The simplest, non-security, data type is plain (line 2),
where two natural numbers serve as identifiers, allowing to
distinguish different data categories. For example, the first
identifier 3 categorises plain 3 9 as a transaction, while
the second identifier 9 differentiates it from other transactions.
In the context of security, several types of data are instru-
mental in reasoning about properties. Therefore, we define
these as separate types encapsulating their details, while also
providing general data constructors (lines 3-6) allowing to treat
them as ordinary data elements. For example, cryptographic
keys are defined by the CryptoKey data type. This data type
encapsulates the different types of keys such as symmetric,
private or public keys. For example, symk 1 represents a
symmetric key with 1 as identifier. Similarly we provide data
types for an Identity, Credential and SessionId.
Data can be operated on by applying (security) transfor-
mations. Our model currently supports three security-related
transformations: encrypting data using a cryptographic key,
calculating a hash value and digitally signing data using a
cryptographic key. Our model also provides constructors for
the data resulting from each of these transformations (lines 7-
9). For example, the result of encrypting plain 3 9 using
cryptographic key symk 1 is represented as enc (plain
3 9) (symk 1). Furthermore, several data elements can be
collected to construct more complex data structures (line 10).
Note that due to the inductive nature of our data type, each
transformation result can again be transformed. For example,
hash values can be encrypted just as any other data element.
B. Process
As part of our model, we define a number of processes,
each encapsulating a well-defined, possibly non-deterministic
behaviour. Since these processes deliver the bulk of the seman-
tics of our model, they serve as the designer’s building blocks
to construct security designs. Internally, a process consists
of a (possibly non-deterministic and infinite) state machine,
and a number of input and output queues. Individual process
instances are identified by a natural number.
The state machine of a process fully governs its input and
output behaviour. This means it determines when to read data
from a queue, the operations to perform on this data, and
when to write the result to a queue. Processes have access to
an unlimited number of input and output queues, from which
data can respectively be read and written in a first-in-first-out
fashion. Within each process, a queue is identified by a natural
number, allowing processes to assign different responsibilities
to their queues. The specific processes offered by our model
can be roughly divided into three types: security processes,
external processes, and auxiliary processes.
Security processes. These processes encapsulate a single
security-related operation (Table I). For example, an encrypter
encrypts its input data using a provided cryptographic key.
To achieve this, an encrypter assigns two queues to key
management, one queue via which keys can be provided and
one via which the current key can be revoked. The remaining
queues of the process serve as input queues for the data to be
encrypted and output queues for the encrypted result.
External processes. An application typically interacts with
external entities. In our model, these are modelled using
external processes (Table II). A user and attacker process
respectively represent a non-malicious and malicious user.
Both contain a set of data (i.e. knowledge) that they can
output. Furthermore, they can learn each piece of data received
via interactions with other processes. Additionally, an attacker
can derive new information from the knowledge it already
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Fig. 1. This traditional DFD of a part of our example banking system is security-specific only because of well-chosen labels.
TABLE I
THE SECURITY PROCESSES DEFINED IN OUR MODEL.
Process Description
Hasher Calculates a hash value of its input data.
Encrypter Encrypts input data with a cryptographic key.
Decrypter Decrypts input data with a cryptographic key.
Authenticator Verifies whether an identity and credential match with a
looked-up version.
Enforcer Enforces input to be cleared before passing on.
Authoriser Encapsulates an authorisation policy by non-
deterministically allowing or denying requests.
Generator Generates a digital signature given a data element and a
cryptographic key.
Verifier Verifies whether data and signature match.
has, and spontaneously obtain new data (i.e. the attacker
guesses data from the point of view of the system). By default,
both derivation and guessing are specified in an omnipotent
manner, so an attacker can derive any data from any other data
and guess any data. Consequently, these abilities should be
constrained by external assumptions when proving properties.
A source and sink represent entities which respectively
provide data to or consume data from other processes. They
can represent users, external systems or internal parts of the
system for which any further details can be abstracted away.
TABLE II
EXTERNAL PROCESSES REPRESENT ENTITIES THAT INTERACT WITH THE
SYSTEM UNDER DESIGN.
Process Description
User Non-malicious user interacting with the system.
Attacker Malicious user interacting with the system.
Source Produces data satisfying a pre-defined function.
Sink Consumes its input.
Auxiliary processes. To connect the security and external
processes into a functional design model, we need a number
of auxiliary processes (Table III). For example, the business
process can, non-deterministically, perform any non-security
operation. This allows to abstract away any non-security
functionality without the need of formalising this functionality.
Another example, a store process represents persistent storage,
such as a file system or database, and records data as key-
value pairs. Each input and output queue of a store process
has, based on its identifier, a single predefined responsibility:
read a value corresponding to a key, writing a key-value pair,
deleting a key-value pair, or listing all used keys.
TABLE III
AUXILIARY PROCESSES TO CONSTRUCT FUNCTIONAL SECURITY DESIGNS.
Process Description
Business Encapsulates non-security related functionality.
Store Stores data as key-value pairs.
Comparator Compares two data elements using a function.
Collector Collects the first data element of its input queues.
Disperser Disperses a collection into its contained elements.
Dropper Non-deterministically forwards or discards its input.
Discarder Discards input if directed to by another process.
Joiner Outputs data from a non-deterministically selected input
queue.
Copier Copies its input to each of its output queues.
Fork Outputs input to a non-deterministically selected output
queue.
Latch Remembers its last input and continues to output it.
C. Network
Processes can communicate with each other by organising
them in a network, thus allowing a designer to model complex
systems. In a network, channels connect an output queue of
one process to an input queue of another process, allowing the
former to communicate its outputs to the latter. Each channel
starts at exactly one output queue and ends at exactly one
input queue. While this may seem a severe restriction, it can
be circumvented using disperser, copier or fork processes to
emulate multiple outgoing channels, and collector or joiner
processes to emulate multiple incoming channels.
Note that channels are very simple elements, and propa-
gate all data instantaneously without failure. More interesting
channels can still be modelled by interposing one or more
(auxiliary) processes. For example, a lossy communication
channel between two processes can be modelled by placing
a dropper between them, instead of directly connecting them.
Since a network is a collection of processes and channels,
the state of a network as a whole is the collection of all process
states, i.e. their internal state combined with the contents of
their queues. There exists a transition between two networks
if the second network can be obtained from the first network
by sequentially performing the following actions: (1) for each
process, perform a local state transition or do nothing, i.e. skip;
and (2) propagate the contents of some or all output queues
along the connected channels
Using this transition relation, an infinite sequence of succes-
sive networks, called a path in our model, can be constructed.
Thus a path s n captures one possible execution of the
modelled system as a sequence s having n as initial network.
IV. MODELLING A SECURITY DESIGN
In this section, we show how designers can model a broad
range of behaviour by organising processes into networks.
Figure 2 shows an example network (using an ad-hoc graphical
notation, the full implementation can be found online [9]),
corresponding to the partial banking system in Figure 1.
Functionality: A minimal amount of functionality must be
modelled, before we are able to reason about the security
properties of our banking application. The customer’s web
browser is modelled as a user process, which initially knows
the username and password of the customer and a transaction
he or she wants to execute. For simplicity we assume that
the customer is already registered at the bank with his or her
username and password. More specifically, the customer store
is instantiated containing a corresponding key-value entry. The
load balancer is the entry point to the banking system, and
is modelled as a fork process that directs incoming requests
to the right process. Note that any other functionality of the
load balancer, such as distributing the load over multiple
instances, is abstracted away. Finally, the business process
makes abstraction of actually executing the transactions.
Simplified HTTPS: In our banking application, the traffic
between the customer’s web browser and the system is en-
crypted. In Figure 2, all data sent by the user or load balancer
is first encrypted by their respective encrypter processes, and
decrypted again upon arrival. The key exchange mechanism
of the underlying protocol is modelled by source processes
producing symmetric keys and copier processes distributing
these keys, and is assumed to be secure. Note that this model
does not ensure data integrity, and thus corresponds to a
simplified version of the well-known HTTPS protocol.
Authentication: Another security solution is authenticating
users using username/password, and (after successful authen-
tication) execute further interactions within a session to avoid
resubmitting this data with every request. The actual authenti-
cation is modelled using a set of collaborating processes, most
notable the authenticator process. Upon arrival of a customer’s
username and password, the authenticator process requests the
credential, if any, stored for this username from the customer
store and verifies whether this credential matches the received
one. If the credentials match, the authenticator enables two
enforcer processes to forward their input (the username and
a session id) to the session store, thereby opening a session,
and forward the session id to the user process.
Sessions: Session ids are generated by a source process.
The user attaches the received session id to its subsequent
transaction requests. For each arriving request, the system
must now verify whether the corresponding session is still
open and, if so, associate the correct identity (i.e. username)
with the request for later authorisation. The session id is sent
as a read request to the session store, which replies with
an acknowledgement and the corresponding username if the
session exists. This username is combined with the transaction
before being forwarded to the business process. If the session
was already closed (e.g. the user logged out), the enforcer will
be instructed to discard its input.
Attacker: The security of a system is usually assessed
with respect to a type of attacker. Consequently, a security
design must explicitly contain an attacker process and the
corresponding attacker model. The attacker model is partially
reflected by the presence or absence of channels between the
attacker and other processes. Since customers connect to the
banking system via the Internet, we are (in this example)
primarily concerned with external attackers that can tamper
with customer requests. This is shown by placing copier,
discarder and joiner processes in between the browser and load
balancer, and connecting these to the attacker (cf. Figure 2).
An attacker can intercept and read (via the copier), modify
(via the joiner) or delete (via the discarder) the data that is
sent from or to the browser. Furthermore, our attacker model
presumes read access to the customer store, e.g. due to a
SQL injection vulnerability. In our model, this is modelled
by connecting the attacker to a read queue of the customer
store. Note that the absence of other channels between the
attacker and the internals of the banking system imply that he
or she has no further access to the internal communication.
V. REASONING ABOUT SECURITY
In this section, we show how the formal semantics of our
model can be used to prove security properties about a design.
A. Expressing security properties
A primal condition for proving whether or not certain
security properties hold in a design is that these properties
themselves are precisely defined. Some common properties are
defined as part of our model, and can be readily instantiated
and reused. Currently, we express the available properties
using linear-time temporal logic (LTL) [11, chapter 3], albeit
other formalisms can be added. In LTL, formulas are expressed
over infinite sequences of states, called a path. In our model, a
network is state, thus a network path as defined earlier can be
considered a path over which LTL formulas can be expressed.
A first common property is data confidentiality, defined
in line with CNSSI-4009 [12] as ‘confidential data is not
disclosed to any unauthorised entity’, where the attacker
process acts as unauthorised entity. More precisely, data d is
confidential in a network n if for each path s n, an attacker
never knows d (lines 11–13).
11 Definition confidential d n :=
12 ∀ a s, is_attacker a n → path s n →
13 s |= always (¬is_attacker_and_knows a d)
Another property is data origin authentication, also called
message authentication, defined by CNSSI-4009 [12] as ‘the
process of verifying that the source of the data is as claimed
and that the data has not been modified’. In terms of our
model, this is expressed as follows: each data element d that
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Fig. 2. In contrast to the traditional DFD notation, our model makes security aspects explicit
satisfies a selector function f, received via input queue qr by
process rcv, must have been previously sent by the process
snd via output queue qs (lines 14–17). The selector function
enables expressing the property for entire categories of data
at once, e.g. all transactions in our banking system.
14 Definition data_origin_authentication f rcv snd qr
qs n :=↪→
15 ∀ s d, path s n → f d →
16 s |= always (contained_in_input d qr rcv →
17 previously (contained_in_output d qs snd)).
For our banking application, we require the data origin
authentication property with respect to all transactions. That
is, each transaction (represented as plain 3 x for any x)
that arrives at the business process should have originated
at the user process (cf. Figure 2). Note that this property
does not counter so-called replay attacks where an attacker
captures a transaction in transit (via the copier in between the
browser and load balancer) and re-sends it at a later time.
Countering such attacks requires entity authentication, which
includes uniqueness and timeliness of arriving data.
B. Proving Security Properties
A proof of a security property can rely on a multitude of
already proven theorems that accompany our model. These
theorems concern the behaviour of processes as well as
networks as a whole, and can be considered an API for writing
proofs. For instance, we supply an attacker knowledge theorem
proving that an attacker has only four ways of knowing data d:
(1) d is part of its initial knowledge; or the attacker previously
(2) guessed d; or (3) learned d; or (4) derived d from other
knowledge. Applying this theorem boils down to employing a
divide and conquer strategy, where the single hypothesis that
the attacker knows d is divided into four smaller ones.
As another example, the stepping theorem says that if d is
found in an input queue of a process, it (1) must have been
there initially; or (2) it was previously present in the connected
output queue.
Proving data origin authentication for transactions in our
banking application boils down to proving that each transac-
tion arriving at the business process was sent by the user pro-
cess. The following paragraphs provide an informal overview
of such a proof; the full proof can be consulted online [9].
We use the above stepping theorem to, starting at the
business process, ‘step backwards’ through our network, and
show for each encountered process that a transaction could not
have originated there. Most of these steps are fairly mechanical
and can be proven using pre-defined theorems.
Less mechanical, hence more interesting, reasoning is re-
quired when we arrive at the attacker process. Intuitively
we have to contradict that the attacker knows a valid trans-
action request, i.e. each enc (collection n [sid x;
plain 3 y]) (symk z) accepted by the system is con-
fidential with respect to the attacker. Using the above attacker
knowledge theorem this can be divided into the four ways an
attacker can obtain such knowledge.
The most challenging of these four goals is proving that
the attacker cannot derive a valid transaction request from all
obtainable knowledge. Given the usage of strong encryption,
e.g. AES, a reasonable assumption is that encrypted data
can only be derived from the corresponding plain text and
key. This reduces the goal into two smaller ones, namely
either collection n [sid x; plain 3 y] or symk
z must be confidential. The latter would be unrealistic, as it
prevents the attacker from knowing any symmetric key.
Proving the confidentiality of collection n [sid x;
plain 3 y] follows a similar divide and conquer strategy.
As before the attacker knowledge theorem gives rise to four
smaller goals, of which the derivation case is the most interest-
ing. By introducing an assumption that a collection can only
be derived from all its individual elements, the goal is reduced
to proving the confidentiality of sid x or plain 3 y.
Because we expect an attacker can produce valid transaction
data, we focus on the confidentiality of sid x. This can
be proven based on the network structure and some extra
assumptions. For example, an attacker should not be able to
guess valid session ids or derive one from other obtained data.
VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Currently our model already integrates several security
mechanisms and properties into a single coherent model. Yet
not all security concepts, e.g. auditing of user actions, are
covered. We are confident such concepts can be fairly easily
added to our model, yielding a more complete security model.
We intend that in time our model serves as a foundation
for a broader security by design approach. Such an approach
should readily fit into current software design processes. Since
modelling a security design using the Coq Proof Assistant
deviates strongly from current notations as DFD or UML,
a more natural notation is necessary. The example graphical
notation used in this paper is a first step in that direction, but
remains at the same level of abstraction as our model itself. A
better notation would more closely align with the designer’s
mindset, by abstracting away the specifics of our model such
as the operation-specific queues, and supporting pre-defined,
reusable compositions of processes.
Furthermore, designers often re-use the same or similar
security solutions in different designs. For example, the use
of an encrypted channel (e.g. TLS) between a client and
a server is common practice. Within our model, we can
formalise such solutions as generic strategies, akin to existing
security patterns but modelled in a more precise manner. Such
strategies then have to be proven correct only once (under
certain assumptions), after which they can be made available
in a catalogue and reused as many times as desired. Instead
of ensuring that each instance of a security solution is correct,
the designer’s task is now reduced to verifying whether or not
the assumptions made by a strategy are satisfied by the design.
To better support designers, we want to automate verifying
assumptions using model checkers. The major challenge here
is to correctly encode our semantics as defined in Coq, into
the input language for the model checker, and at the same time
avoid running into a state explosion problem.
Finally, the benefits of a proven secure design can be drasti-
cally increased when the proven guarantees can be transferred
to its actual implementation. Efficiently verifying implemented
software against its proven design requires further research.
VII. RELATED WORK
Over the past decade or so, several approaches to formalise
and analyse security designs have been proposed, as attested
by several existing surveys in this research area [6], [13], [14].
A prominent approach is UMLsec [15], which introduces
UML Machines and UML Machine Systems, similar to pro-
cesses and networks in our model. They enable formal tools
such as automated theorem provers and model checkers to be
used to verify security properties of annotated UML models.
Xu and Nygard [16] formalise a design and threats as
aspect-oriented petri nets. A design is considered vulnerable
when the threat petri net can execute. If so, a mitigating petri
net aspect can be woven into the design.
Gu¨rgens et al. [17] describe the behaviour of a system as
sets of sequences of actions combined with the knowledge and
view agents have about the system. Based on these sequences,
security requirements such as authenticity can be specified.
The above approaches incorporate security into the func-
tional description of the system. Whereas our model abstracts
away non-security elements of the design where possible.
Heyman et al. [18] formally model several security patterns
using Alloy [19], allowing designers to integrate these into
their design and evaluating security properties using the as-
sumptions accompanying these patterns. Due to its reliance on
Alloy the assumptions are only valid for a finite set of designs,
whereas guarantees arising from proofs in our model are valid
for all designs. Furthermore, the approach is limited to the
formalised patterns and thus less flexible than our model.
Several more specialised approaches focus exclusively on
formalising and analysing access control aspects, for example
AMF [20], Georg et al. [21], and SecureUML [22]. In contrast,
we intend to provide a broad and comprehensive model.
Furthermore, there exists a large amount of techniques
to verify cryptographic protocols [23]. While our model is
suitable for a rudimentary analysis of such protocols, we do
not aim to supplant these specialised techniques but consider
them complementary. For example, our model is not intended
to discover attacks such as the POODLE attack against SSL.
Aside from security-specific approaches, multiple ap-
proaches provide a more formal foundation for software
design. Two well-known ones are Communicating Sequential
Processes (CSP) [24], focusing on concurrency, and the spi
calculus [25], originally intended to analyse security protocols.
Our primary reason for not starting from these is flexibility
in the definition of our model. By defining our own model,
we can fine-tune its semantics without possible limitations of
an underlying formalism. Furthermore, the use of the Coq
Proof assistant gives us a flexible manner to prove security
properties, while automatically verifying the correctness of
each proof. It remains to be investigated to what extent our
model can be integrated with these calculi.
Several proposals extend DFDs with a formal semantics. For
example, France [26] associates a formal semantics, based on
algebraic specification, with control-extended DFDs (C-DFD).
This extension of DFD introduces, among others, queued
flows allowing constructs similar to our collector and disperser
processes. Properties such as safety can be verified against a,
semi-automatically generated, formal specification.
Alternatively, DFDs have also been enriched with petri net
like semantics [27], [28]. There are some similarities with
our model. For example, the authors of [28] define bubbles,
corresponding roughly to processes in a DFD, that fire in two
steps, namely first reading from input flows, and then writing
computed values to output flows. In our model, a process
behaves similarly, but it can have multiple intermediate steps.
Also, in contrast to the generic bubbles, the processes in our
model have pre-defined semantics.
Furthermore, Fraser et al. [29] and Larsen et al. [30] follow
an alternative of transforming DFDs to more formal languages,
e.g. VDM, allowing to construct formal proofs.
In general, two important distinctions between our model
and the above DFD formalisations should be mentioned. First,
none of these formalisations are specific to security, in contrast
to our security-focused model. Second, with the exception of
VDM, they do not support the automatic verification of proofs
that our model provides via its implementation in Coq.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Many stakeholders advocate the principle of security by
design, yet designing secure software still is an arduous task.
Designers typically have to resort to their own knowledge and
experience, possibly augmented with guiding methodologies
such as STRIDE and informal catalogues of security solutions.
A very significant challenge for designers is to correctly in-
stantiate a security solution; selecting a suitable solution is not
the critical challenge. Providing designers with techniques that
support them in the correct instantiation of the chosen security
solution can obviously improve this situation. Therefore, we
proposed a model, inspired by Data Flow Diagrams (DFD),
but tailored to security and backed by well-defined semantics.
This paper showed how this model supports the precise
expression of and reasoning about the security-relevant aspects
of a software design. We provide a formal implementation
of our model by using the Coq Proof Assistant. This en-
ables thorough verification of modelled designs by facilitating
formal proofs that the applied solutions are indeed correct.
Additionally, the use of a proof assistant automatically ensures
the correctness of the proofs themselves. Thus our model can
complement individual expert knowledge and experience with
strong, proven guarantees. Furthermore, we have illustrated
our model using a realistically sized banking application and
shown how our model enables proving correctness of the
applied security solutions, with respect to a security property.
We believe that our model, along with the enabled verifi-
cation, can serve as a solid basis for the security by design
paradigm. It provides a formal foundation enabling designers
to reason about security problems and solutions, and on which
more extensive and user-friendly modelling and analysis tools
can be built.
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